

FILED
Court of Appeals
Division I
State of Washington
1/29/2020 4:30 PM

FILED
SUPREME COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON
1/31/2020
BY SUSAN L. CARLSON
CLERK

Supreme Court No. 98136-1
(COA No. 78413-7-I)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

J.K.T.,

Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER AND COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Jeremy,¹ a minor child, asks this Court to accept review of a published Court of Appeals decision affirming his convictions for two counts of murder in the first degree and three counts of assault in the first degree. These charges stem from a shooting that occurred in Jeremy's homeless encampment when he was only 13 years old. A copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion is attached to this petition.² A copy of a separate order denying a motion to correct the Court of Appeals' opinion is attached to this petition.³

B. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

(1) The Privacy Act dictates that a court cannot issue a warrant to record a nonconsenting individual unless the affiant has probable cause to believe the nonconsenting party committed, was engaged in, or was about to commit a felony. However, a provision exists within the act that renders admissible a conversation with a nonconsenting party that was made "incident to a lawfully recorded conversation."

Jeremy argued, and the State agreed, that no probable cause existed to record Jeremy, who never consented to being recorded. Despite this, the

¹ As he has done throughout his briefing at the Court of Appeals, this petition will also refer to J.K.T. by the pseudonym "Jeremy."

² Appendix A.

³ Appendix B.

consenting parties to the recording targeted Jeremy and intended to record him. However, the Court of Appeals concluded the term “incident” in this provision of the privacy act essentially means “as part of” a recording, and so it concluded that because probable cause existed to record another nonconsenting party (Jeremy’s brother), the recording was admissible.

Should this Court accept review because (1) the court’s interpretation of the privacy act violates numerous principles of construction; and (2) this case presents an important issue of first impression? RAP 13.4(b)(1); RAP 13.4(b)(4).

(2) The privacy act also required the government to identify “the character and location of the particular wire communication facilities involved or the particular place where the oral communication is to be recorded.” Here, the government recorded Jeremy’s conversation; it did not use a wire communication facility in order to intercept his conversations.

(a) Jeremy argued the affidavit to record failed to identify the particular place to be recorded because the affidavit expressly identified the location to be recorded as “somewhere in an around Seattle in one of the many homeless camps in the area.” However, the Court of Appeals concluded the government complied with the Privacy Act because it believed the statute required the government to merely identify the

character and location of the particular place where the recording is expected to occur. Should this Court accept review because (1) this interpretation also violates numerous principles of statutory construction; and (2) also presents an important issue of first impression for this Court? RAP 13.4(b)(1); RAP 13.4(b)(4).

(b) Even assuming the Court of Appeals' interpretation was correct, should this Court accept review because merely describing the location of the recording as "somewhere in and around Seattle in one of the many homeless encampments in the area" fails to adequately describe the character and location of the particular place where the recording will occur? RAP 13.4(b)(4).

(iii) While the affidavit to record identified the location of the recording as "somewhere in and around Seattle in one of the many homeless encampments in the area," the order authorizing the recording allowed the government to record "at unknown locations in King County." Should this Court accept review to determine whether the order allowing the police to record a nonconsenting party must also comply with the Privacy Act? RAP 13.4(b)(4).

(2) While this case was pending, this Court issued its opinion in *State v. Burns*, 193 Wn.2d 190, 438 P.3d 1183 (2019), which held that under RAP 2.5(a)(3), defendants cannot raise confrontation clause claims

for the first time on appeal. However, in *Burns*, the defendant never raised a confrontation clause claim. At trial, Jeremy actually challenged the admission of the recording based on the confrontation clause, but on appeal, he raised a confrontation clause challenge to the admission of the recording on different grounds. The Court of Appeals refused to reach the merits of Jeremy's claim.

a. Should this Court accept review because the rule announced in *Burns* only applies when the defendant completely fails to raise a confrontation clause challenge? RAP 13.4(b)(1); RAP 13.4(b)(4).

b. Should this Court accept review to assess whether, congruent with article I, section 22 of our constitution, statements against penal interest that inculcate a defendant can be admitted at trial if the defendant is unable to meet the declarant "face-to face?" RAP 13.4(b)(3).

(3) The accused has the right to present a defense, and evidentiary rules that arbitrarily or disproportionately infringe on this right must fall if they conflict with this right. Jeremy tried to admit two declarants' statements against penal interest that exculpated him from criminal culpability. The court refused due to an outdated nine-factor test that was originally created to protect a defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. This test no longer serves this purpose.

Should this Court accept review to assess whether this nine-factor test is both arbitrary and disproportionate? RAP 13.4(b)(3).

(4) Our constitution provides for a jury trial for all individuals accused of a crime. The scope of the jury trial right is determined by the framers' intent and the right as it existed at the time the Washington Constitution was adopted. At the time the constitution was adopted and for nearly 50 years afterwards, juveniles charged with crimes were afforded a jury trial. Should this Court accept review and hold that our constitution requires a jury trial for a juvenile accused of a crime? RAP 13.4(b)(3).

(5) The Court of Appeals' opinion incorrectly notes that Jeremy conceded probable cause existed to record his brother, James. Jeremy made no such concession that probable cause existed to record his brother, and so he filed a motion asking the court to remove this portion of the opinion. The Court of Appeals refused. Should this Court accept review because no reason exists for the Court of Appeals to maintain the language in the opinion that claims Jeremy made a concession he never made? RAP 13.4(b)(4).

C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jeremy's background and arrest

By the age of 13, Jeremy had only experienced a "hard life." Ex. 5, pg. 16. In Jeremy's early childhood, his father both neglected and

abandoned him. Ex. 5, pg. 3. In his mother's care, Jeremy experienced medical and educational neglect, domestic violence exposure, and criminal exploitation. Ex. 5, pgs. 12-13. By 2016, the Department of Children and Youth Services received 33 referrals relating to Jeremy and his siblings, which also included allegations of physical abuse. Ex. 5, pg. 5. The government terminated his mother's parental rights in 2014, but Jeremy repeatedly ran away from placements in order to return to his mother and his brothers, James and Jerome. Ex. 5, pgs. 12-13. The brothers and their mother alternated between living in homeless encampments and motels. Ex. 5, pg. 22.

In February of 2016, the police arrested Jeremy and his brothers in his tent in a homeless encampment. 9RP 793; 10RP 959; 14RP 1872-73. After the police drove him to the police station, Jeremy learned that a conversation he and his brothers had with their two uncles, Reno and Lucky, led to his arrest and the arrest of his brothers.

Lucky's history

Lucky is homeless and is a registered sex offender and drug dealer. 2RP 48; 3RP 306; 12RP 1521. In June of 2015, October of 2015, and early January of 2016, Lucky was arrested for drug-related charges. 12RP 1508-09. The trio of drug charges was set to extend Lucky's sex offender registration period, which would continue to limit where Lucky could live

and where he could be employed. 12RP 1506-09. Sex offender registration also subjected Lucky to arrest and imprisonment if he did not register as required. 12RP 1507. So, he reached out to Detective Jonathan Huber after one of his arrests to offer him some information about some downtown drug dealers so that he could “better his situation.” 2RP 106-07.

Detective Huber told Lucky he would “look into it” and see if he could help him. 2RP 109. Detective Huber and Lucky exchanged phone numbers. 2RP 112, 159.

The shooting

In the evening on January 26, 2016, five people were shot in a homeless community known as “The Jungle” in Seattle. CP 14. The victims of the shooting were James Tran, Jeannine Brooks, Amy Jo Shinault, Tracy Bauer, and Phat Nguyen. CP 10-13. Phat was the preeminent drug dealer in The Jungle, and he primarily dealt drugs at “The Cave” region of The Jungle. 11RP 1310, 1352, 1358.

Eyewitnesses reported seeing between four to seven males in masks commit the shooting; some of the witnesses reported seeing the individuals also stealing things and demanding money during the shooting. CP 14-15; 10RP 1089-90; 10RP 1096, 1100; 16RP 1924. James Tran and Jeannine Brooks died, but Ms. Shinault, Ms. Bauer, and Phat survived the shooting. 11RP 1326, 1329.

Detective Huber connects with Lucky

On the night of the shooting, Detective Huber was driving near The Jungle area when he heard a radio broadcast saying the suspects of the shooting were Samoan males. 2RP 40. Because Lucky is both Samoan and homeless, Detective Huber decided to call Lucky the following day to see if he had any information about the shooting. 2RP 48-50. At first, Lucky claimed he heard Vietnamese people perpetrated the shooting. 2RP 49; Ex. 12, pg. 23. But sometime afterward, Lucky called Detective Huber back to report that James, Jeremy's 17-year-old brother, confessed to him that he perpetrated the shooting because "he was broke" and that James lived in a tent with his brothers somewhere near Safeco Field. 2RP 50, 53-54. Lucky did not know if James' brothers were present during the shooting. 2RP 54.

After sharing that information with Detective Huber, the two agreed to meet in person. 2RP 66. At the meeting, Lucky brought his brother, Reno, who is also related to Jeremy and his brothers. 3RP 254. Reno and Lucky both agreed to wear a wire and record James. Ex. 12, pg. 51.

Pursuant to Washington's Privacy Act, Detective James Cooper drafted an affidavit for authority to record Reno and Lucky's surreptitious conversation with the brothers. Ex. 9, pg. 1. The affidavit states that probable cause exists to record "James and other unknown individuals."

Ex. 9, pg. 2. However, the affidavit also notes Lucky and Reno believed James and his brothers would talk to them, and it describes James and his brothers as suspects. Ex. 9, pg. 5. The affidavit also continuously refers to the challenges of recording James *and* his brothers. Ex. 9, pg. 5. Detective Cooper later reaffirmed in his testimony that he believed Jeremy was a suspect, and Detective Cooper indicated the affidavit reflected a desire to not only record James, but also Jeremy. RP 495, 533. Indeed, Lucky and Reno were paid to investigate not only James, but also his brothers. 2RP 86-87.

The affidavit also identifies the location of the recording as “somewhere in or around Seattle in one of the many homeless camps in the area.” Ex. 9, pg. 5

Lucky and Reno surreptitiously record James and his brothers

The court issued the warrant, which allowed the police to record “James and other unknown individuals” at “unknown locations in King County.” Ex. 9, pgs. 5, 10. Shortly afterwards, Lucky and Reno arrived at James and his brothers’ homeless encampment wired with a camera.

During the video, Lucky continuously indicates a desire to not only record James, but also his brothers. First, he discusses how he is recording James and his brothers in order to “save” their lives. Ex. 44 (Video 1-12:35:01-12:35:26; 12:58:26-12:58:31). Later on, he tells people at the

homeless encampment that he “wants to talk to the boys,” that he “need[s] to talk to them,” and “that’s why [he was there].” Ex. 44 (Video 2-13:12:10). Afterwards, Lucky tells another person he was “trying to get the boys down here” to talk to him. Ex. 44 (Video 3-13:15:14). When Lucky finally sees Jeremy and his brothers, he tells them, “man, I’m here to talk to you guys.” Ex. 44 (Video 3-13:24:21).

During their conversation with Lucky, Jeremy and his brothers made statements that led the police to believe they participated in the shootings. Ex. 44.

The following legal proceedings

Based on the recordings, the police charged Jeremy with two counts of murder in the first degree and three counts of assault in the first degree. CP 10-13. Based on what the brothers said during the recordings, the State pursued these charges on the theory that James and Jerome perpetrated the shootings and Jeremy helped further his brother’s actions during the robbery/shooting. *See, e.g.*, 10RP 960. Jeremy and his brothers moved to suppress the surreptitious recordings, but the court denied the motion. CP 202-06.

Jeremy proceeded to trial in juvenile court, and the State separately prosecuted his brothers in adult court. Jeremy attempted to admit evidence showing that two individuals by the names of Francis and Ace had

claimed they were involved in the shooting and agreed with Ms. Bauer that someone by the name of Juice was her shooter, but the court precluded Jeremy from admitting this evidence. CP 304-08. Jeremy also moved to exclude the surreptitious video recording of him and his brothers on the basis that his brother's statements were hearsay and he could not confront and cross-examine his brothers, but the court denied this motion too. CP 295-97.

The court found Jeremy guilty of two counts of murder in the first degree and three counts of assault in the first degree. CP 351. His brothers were separately tried in adult court, twice resulting in a hung jury; upon transfer of the case from Kent to Seattle, Jeremy's brothers were convicted.⁴ The Court of Appeals affirmed Jeremy's conviction on December 30, 2019. Op. at 1.

D. ARGUMENT

- 1. This Court should accept review because the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the privacy act violates numerous principles of construction, and this case presents important issues of first impression regarding the protections of the privacy act.**

⁴ Alex Halverson, *Brothers found guilty after 3rd trial of killing 2, wounding 3 in 2016 'Jungle' shooting*, Seattle PI (Dec. 12, 2019), <https://www.seattlepi.com/local/crime/article/Brothers-found-guilty-of-killing-2-wounding-3-in-14902786.php>.

Washington's Privacy Act protects an individual's privacy rights, and it is one of the most restrictive electronic surveillance laws in the nation. *State v. Roden*, 179 Wn.2d 893, 898, 321 P.3d 1183 (2014). The act "puts a high value on the privacy of communications," and the primary purpose of the act is to protect an individual's private conversations from public dissemination, including dissemination at trial. *State v. Christensen*, 153 Wn.2d 186, 200, 102 P.3d 789 (2004); *State v. Fjermestad*, 114 Wn.2d 828, 834, 791 P.2d 897 (1990) (referencing *State v. Wanrow*, 88 Wn.2d 221, 233, 559 P.2d 548 (1977)).

Under Washington's Privacy Act, electronic recordings memorializing private conversations are only admissible at trial if (1) everyone recorded consented to the recording of the private conversation; (2) a judicial authorization permitted the police to record the conversation without the consent of all of the parties; or (3) a statute within the act specifically permits the admissibility of the recording. *Fjermestad*, 114 Wn.2d at 830; *see, e.g.* RCW 9.73.090 (exempting the protections of the Privacy Act under certain emergency circumstances).

- a. The Court of Appeals misinterpreted a provision of the privacy act that permits the admissibility of recordings that are merely incident to a recording.

In relevant part, the affidavit must establish probable cause to believe the nonconsenting party has committed, is engaged in, or is about

to commit a felony. RCW 9.73.090(2). However, a provision exists within this statute that states,

Any recording or interception of a communication or conversation *incident* to a lawfully recorded or intercepted communication or conversation pursuant to this subsection shall be lawful and may be divulged.

RCW 9.73.090(2) (emphasis added).

Based on the court's reading of select portions of two dictionary's definitions of "incident," the Court of Appeals ruled that the term "incident" means "ancillary," or "as part of." Op. at 9-10. It affirmed, theorizing that because Jeremy was recorded merely "as part of" James' recording, no violation occurred.

The court was wrong for several reasons. First, the court's interpretation of the term ignores the more contextually-appropriate and natural definitions of the term "incident," and the court actually misquoted a portion of one of the definitions it relied upon. Second, the court's interpretation violates the legislature's intent. Third, the court's interpretation fails to take into account the entire privacy act, and it ignores the principle of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*. Fourth, this interpretation contravenes the rule of lenity. And finally, the court's interpretation leads to absurd results.

The Court of Appeals first turned to Webster’s Dictionary to interpret the term “incident.” Op. at 9-10. Webster’s Dictionary provides several definitions of the term “incident,” and the term “incident” can be used as both a noun and an adjective. *Incident*, Merriam Webster.⁵ Four definitions are provided for “incident” when the term is used as noun, and they are as follows:

- 1a: an occurrence of an action or situation that is a separate unit of experience: HAPPENING
- b: an accompanying minor occurrence or condition CONCOMITANT
- 2: an action likely to lead to grave consequences especially in diplomatic matters (a serious border *incident*)
- 3: something dependent on or subordinate to something else of greater or principal importance

Id. (capitalization and emphasis in original).

The Court relied in part on definition number three, which is one of the noun definitions. Op. at 10.

However, this is not the most natural reading of the statute, particularly in light of the entire act and our legislature’s decision to craft one of the most restrictive recording laws in the nation. *See State v. Sweany*, 174 Wn.2d 909, 915, 281 P.3d 305 (2012); *Christensen*, 153 Wn.2d at 199-200. Again, the statute reads as follows:

Any recording or interception of a communication or conversation *incident* to a lawfully recorded or intercepted communication or

⁵ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incident>.

conversation pursuant to this subsection shall be lawful and may be divulged.

The second noun definition—“an accompanying minor occurrence or condition”—reads most naturally from this statute. This definition uses the term “concomitant” to describe its meaning, and this term means “accompanying, especially in a subordinate or incidental way.” *Concomitant*, Webster’s Dictionary.⁶ In turn, the term “incidental” means, “being likely to ensue as a chance or minor consequence.” *Incidental*, Merriam Webster.⁷

While the Court of Appeals also relied on the 11th edition of the Black’s Law Dictionary to support its interpretation, it misquoted a portion of the dictionary’s definition of the term “incident.” Op. at 10. The Court of Appeals quoted the definition as “dependent on, subordinate to, arising out of, or otherwise connected with (something else, usu. of greater importance).” Op. at 10. However, the definition that appears in the dictionary actually defines the term “incident” as “a dependent, subordinate, or *consequential part (of something else)*.” (emphasis added). *Incident*, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019).

However, it appears from the context of the statute that the term “incident” can be construed as an adjective, as it appears to modify the

⁶ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/concomitant>.

⁷ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incidental#h1>.

term “to a lawfully recorded or intercepted communication.” RCW 9.94.090(2). Webster’s Dictionary provides three definitions for the term “incident” when it is used as an adjective:

- 1: occurring or likely to occur especially as a minor consequence or accompaniment
- 2: dependent on or relating to another thing in law
- 3: falling or striking on something

Incident, Merriam Webster.⁸

The most natural definition to apply to the statute is the first definition, which emphasizes that something is “incident” to something else if it is merely a consequence of some other thing. This aligns with the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the term “incident,” and it also aligns with the most natural noun definition that applies to the statute.

Consequently, the statute permits the admission of a recording from a nonconsenting participant if it “just so happens” to befall as a consequence of recording another nonconsenting party (for whom probable cause exists to record). However, this is not what occurred in the present case, as all of the consenting parties to the recording *intended* to record Jeremy; it was not as if Jeremy just so happened to be present and the consenting parties recorded him.

⁸ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incident>.

Jeremy's interpretation closely follows the legislature's intent while the Court of Appeals' definition strays from it. If any ambiguity about the meaning of the privacy act lingers, courts must resolve it in favor of effectuating the intent behind the act. *Christensen*, 153 Wn.2d at 199-200. Our legislature has consistently "tip[ped] the balance in favor of individual privacy at the expense of law enforcement's ability to gather evidence without a warrant." *Id.* at 199.

Moreover, when assessing a statute's meaning, a court must examine the entire act rather than a single phrase at issue. *In re Sehome Park Cntr., Inc.*, 127 Wn.2d 774, 903 P.2d (1995); *In re the Pers. Restraint Petition of Piercy*, 101 Wn.2d 490, 492, 681 P.2d 223 (1984) . This Court adheres to the doctrine of *expresio unius est exclusio alterius*, which holds a Court must presume the Legislature's omission of a term used elsewhere within a statute was deliberate; therefore, the term cannot be "read in" to a portion of the statute that does not mention the term in question. *See State v. Delgado*, 148 Wn.2d 723, 728-29, 63 P.3d 792 (2003).

The legislature carved out an exception to the general requirements of the privacy act and the "all-party" consent rule for certain crimes, allowing the government to record individuals who are not even "incident" to a recording. The Legislature amended the privacy act to provide

exceptions for crimes involving the unlawful manufacturing, selling, and distributing of controlled substances. Laws of 1989, ch. 271, § 201. One of the amendments expressly allows the police to record individuals that were not identified in the affidavit if these individuals “are brought into the conversation or transaction by the nonconsenting party or if the nonconsenting party or such additional persons cause or invite the consenting party to enter another jurisdiction.” Laws of 1989, ch. 271, § 204; RCW 9.73.230(3); *see also State v. Forest*, 85 Wn. App. 62, 70, 930 P.2d 941 (1997). Another portion of this legislation expressly states that the government can record persons not named in the authorization. Laws of 1989, ch. 271, § 205(5); RCW 9.73.090(5).

In 2011, the legislature again amended the privacy act; this time, it expressly adopted the relaxed provisions of the privacy act for drug trafficking crimes for crimes involving the commercial sexual exploitation of children. Laws of 2011, ch. 241, § 1. Accordingly, the “additional person” provision that allows the police to record unidentified, additional persons involved in recordings for drug trafficking crimes also exists for crimes involving the commercial sexual abuse of children. RCW 9.73.230(1)(b)(ii), (3). This provision *only* exists for crimes involving the commercial sexual abuse of children and drug trafficking, as it does not appear elsewhere in the privacy act.

Additionally, the Court of Appeals’ opinion ignores principles of lenity. “In criminal cases, fairness dictates that statutes should be literally and strictly construed and that courts should refrain from using possible but strained interpretations.” *State v. Garcia*, 179 Wn.2d 828, 837, 38 P.3d 266 (2014); *see, e.g.*, RCW 9.73.010; RCW 9.73.090, RCW 9.73.260 (assigning criminal culpability for violating the privacy act); *see also State v. Kent*, No. 43909-7-II, 2014 WL 690160 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2014)⁹ (using rule of lenity to interpret privacy act).

And finally, the Court of Appeals’ opinion leads to absurd results, as exemplified by this case. “A reading that produces absurd results should be avoided, if possible, because [the court] presume[s] the legislature does not intend them.” *State v. Engel*, 166 Wn.2d 572, 579, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). Under the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the term “incident,” the government can recognize no probable cause exists to record a nonconsenting party, but it can target this nonconsenting party, intentionally record him or her anyway, and elicit potentially incriminating information so long as it gathers probable cause to record one party whom they also intend to record. That is wholly incompatible with the privacy act, where consent is key. In the absence of consent, probable cause must

⁹ This case is unpublished and is cited to pursuant to GR 14.1.

exist to record *every* nonconsenting, targeted party, unless the privacy act expressly provides an exception, which it has done for certain crimes, but not the ones Jeremy was convicted of committing.

- b. The Court of Appeals also erred in interpreting a provision of the privacy act that requires the government to identify the particular location of the recording.

Per the privacy act, the government had to identify “the character and location of the particular wire communication facilities involved or the particular place where the oral communication is to be recorded.” RCW 9.73.130(d). As the government recorded Jeremy’s conversation and did not use a wire communication facility to record him, Jeremy argued the affidavit failed to conform to the privacy act because it failed to identify the particular location of the recording, as it identified the place to be recorded as “somewhere in or around Seattle in one of the many homeless camps in the area.” Ex. 9, pg. 5. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding the government complied with the privacy act because it interpreted the statute as requiring the government to merely identify the character and location of the particular place where the recording is expect to occur. Op. at 11-18. Believing the affidavit complied with its interpretation, the court affirmed. Moreover, Jeremy argued the actual order also failed to comply with the privacy act because

it allowed the government to record Jeremy at “unknown locations in King County.” Ex. 9, pg. 10. The court rejected this argument too.

The court was wrong for several reasons. First, the court’s reliance on the series qualifier canon is misplaced, and its interpretation of the statute violates the last antecedent rule of construction. Second, even assuming the court’s interpretation is correct, the affidavit still failed to comply with the privacy act. Third, the court’s interpretation leads to absurd results. Fourth, the court appears to have erroneously examined evidence beyond the four corners of the affidavit to affirm. And fifth, it makes no sense for an order made pursuant to the privacy act to deviate from the requirements of the privacy act, and so the court was wrong in rejecting Jeremy’s argument that the order must also comply with the privacy act.

The court used the “series qualifier canon” to support its interpretation of the statute, but this canon is inapplicable to this statute. Op. at 13-14. Under this canon, “there is a presumption that when there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.” *Peacehealth St. Joseph Medical Cntr. v. Dep’t of Revenue*, ___ Wn. App. ___, 449 P.3d 676, 680 (2019), *review granted* 455 P.3d 164 (2019). “This rule applies when two textual signals are present: first, when

the modifying phrase makes sense with all items in the series; and second, when the modifying clause appears at the end of a single, integrated list.”

Id. (referencing *Lockhart v. U.S.*, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 958, 965, 194 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2016)). The statute reads as follows:

The character and location of the particular wire communication facilities involved or the particular place where the oral communication is to be recorded

RCW 9.73.130(d).

While the modifying phrase (which, according to the Court of Appeals, was “character and location”) conceivably makes sense with all of the items in this series, the modifying clause appears in the beginning of the list, not at the end. This canon does not apply.

The Court of Appeals’ interpretation also contravenes the last antecedent rule. “The last antecedent rule provides that qualifying or modifying words and phrases refer to the last antecedent.” *State v. Bunker*, 169 Wn.2d 571, 578, 238 P.3d 487 (2010). Here, the modifying phrase “character and location” should be presumed to only apply to “particular wire communication facilities involved,” while the modifying term “particular” applies to the “place where the oral communication is to be recorded.”

This interpretation is consistent with this Court’s directive that any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of effectuating the intent behind the

act. *Christensen*, 153 Wn.2d at 199-200. Our legislature has consistently “tip[ped] the balance in favor of individual privacy at the expense of law enforcement’s ability to gather evidence without a warrant.” *Id.* at 199. This is especially true given the fact that our legislature has relaxed the location requirement for specific crimes which are not at issue in the present case. *Compare* RCW 9.73.090(5) *with* RCW 9.73.130(d); *see also Delgado*, 148 Wn.2d at 728-29.

Even if we assume the court’s interpretation was correct (that the privacy act requires the government to identify the character and location of the particular place), the affidavit still failed to conform to the privacy act. The affidavit identifies the location of the recording as “somewhere in or around Seattle in one of the many homeless camps in the area.” Ex. 9, pg. 5. Seattle is 83.9 square miles, and there are 400 homeless encampments in Seattle. Visit Seattle;¹⁰ Casey McNerthney, *Seattle’s illegal homeless encampments: a Q-and-A on the city’s response*, KIRO 7 (Aug. 29, 2018).¹¹ Undoubtedly, each of these camps have a different “character,” and each of these 400 encampments are certainly at 400 different location.

¹⁰ <https://visitseattle.org/press/press-kit/seattle-facts/> (last visited Jan. 27, 2020); Casey McNerthney, *Seattle’s illegal homeless encampments: a Q-and-A on the city’s response*

¹¹ <https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/seattle-s-illegal-homeless-encampments-a-q-and-a-on-the-city-s-response/779251618/>.

It is important to note that taken to its logical conclusion, the Court of Appeals' opinion would also condone an affidavit that states that a nonconsenting party is expected to be recorded at "a house in or around Seattle." If "a homeless camp" is an adequate descriptor, why not "house?" This, of course, is a wholly absurd result. *Engel*, 166 Wn.2d at 579.

The court appears to have believed the affidavit identified the location of the recording as "near/under 4th Ave. South and Edgar Martinez Way in Seattle;" however, while this location was *mentioned* in the affidavit, it was only mentioned in the context of the police having probable cause to record "James and other unknown individuals." Ex. 9, pg. 4. The opinion also notes Lucky explained the encampment was near clothing donation store like Goodwill, but this is not mentioned in the affidavit.

Finally, the court was wrong in concluding the order need not mirror the requirements of the affidavit. Op. at 12, n. 8. This would mean the police could comply with the requirements of RCW 9.73.130—including the requirement that the police identify the particular location of the recording in the affidavit—but a court could nevertheless execute a warrant to record anyone all throughout Washington State. This interpretation violates numerous principles of construction. First, it would

render the “particularity” requirement of the superfluous. *J.P.*, 149 Wn.2d 444, 450. No point exists in naming the particular location of a recording if a judge has the ability to authorize the government to record someone anywhere in Washington.

This Court should accept review.

2. This Court should accept review to clarify the extent of this Court’s holding in *Burns* and to assess whether, under our constitution, statements against penal interest that inculcate a defendant can be admitted if the defendant is unable to confront the declarant “face-to-face.”

- a. This Court should clarify that *Burns*’ holding is limited to circumstances where no confrontation clause challenge is lodged at trial.

At trial, Jeremy moved to exclude the surreptitious video recording of him and his brothers on the basis that his brother’s statements were hearsay, but also because he could not confront and cross-examine his brothers. CP 295-97. The court denied the motion and admitted the video. On appeal, Jeremy argued the tape should have been excluded under different confrontation clause grounds; specifically, that under our State’s confrontation clause, the statements could not be admitted because statements against penal interest were inadmissible at trial at the time of the ratification of our state constitution.

The Court of Appeals declined to reach this argument based on this Court's opinion in *Burns*. Op. at 18-20. In *Burns*, this Court held that to raise a confrontation clause challenge on appeal, "a defendant [must] raise an objection at trial or waive the right of confrontation." 193 Wn.2d at 210. But in *Burns*, the defendant made no objections on the admissibility of evidence based on the confrontation clause. In contrast, here, Jeremy lodged an objection based on the confrontation clause, albeit on different grounds. Consequently, *Burns* does not control, and this Court should accept review to clarify the parameters of the ruling in *Burns*.

- b. This Court should accept review to assess whether a declarant's statements against penal interest that inculcate a defendant are admissible under our state's confrontation clause.

The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses can be more protective under our state constitution under certain circumstances. *State v. Pugh*, 167 Wn.2d 825, 835, 225 P.3d 892 (2009). Article I, section 22 of our State Constitution affords the defendant the right to "meet the witnesses against him face to face." Const. art. I, §22.

To determine whether article I, section 22 of our State constitution yields more protections than the Sixth Amendment's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, this Court examines "(1) the constitutional text; (2) the historical treatment of the interest at stake as disclosed by relevant

case law and statutes; and (3) the current implications of recognizing or not recognizing an interest.” *Pugh*, 167 Wn.2d at 835 (referencing *State v. Chenoweth*, 160 Wn.2d 454, 462, 158 P.3d 595 (2007)).

Historically, Washington did not admit statements against penal interest for nearly the first 100 years of its statehood. This Court first grappled with statements against penal interest in 1967 and observed that other states admitted such statements, but ultimately declined to address whether Washington would recognize this hearsay exception. *State v. Garrison*, 71 Wn.2d 312, 313-15, 427 P.2d 1012 (1967).

In 1978, this Court held that under the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in *Chambers*, statements against penal interest that *exculpate* a defendant can be admitted at trial. *State v. Young*, 89 Wn.2d 613, 626-27, 574 P.2d 1171 (1978).

The first time this Court held that statements against penal interest that *inculcated* a defendant could be admitted at trial was in 1982, in *Parris*. 98 Wn.2d at 153-54. It was around this time that Washington adopted verbatim the federal rule of evidence that permitted the admission of statements against penal interest. *Id.* at 146. The majority in *Parris* did not assess whether article I, section 22 prohibited statements against interest that inculcated a defendant, and it appears the defendant did not

argue such statements were barred from admission under this provision of the state constitution.

This Court should accept review to determine whether such statements are admissible under our constitution. RAP 13.4(b)(3).

3. This Court should accept review to determine whether the nine-factor reliability test to determine the admissibility of exculpatory statements against penal interest is arbitrary and disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional.

In a criminal proceeding, the Sixth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and article I, sections 3 and 22, afford the accused the right to defend against the State's accusations. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Const. arts. I, § 3, 22; *Chambers v. Mississippi*, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973); *State v. Hudlow*, 99 Wn.2d 1, 14-15, 659 P.2d 514 (1983).

While the State has latitude to establish rules concerning the admissibility of evidence, the constitution always limits this latitude. *Holmes v. South Carolina*, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006). Thus, if a state evidentiary rule infringes upon a defendant's right to present a defense and is either arbitrary or disproportionate to the purpose the evidentiary rule is designed to serve, then the rule must fall in light of the defendant's right to present a defense. *Id.* at 325-27 (describing cases where the United States Supreme Court

invalidated state evidentiary rules that infringed upon an individual's right to present a defense) (internal citations omitted.) An evidentiary rule is arbitrary if it excludes important defense evidence without serving any legitimate interest. *Id.* at 325. And an evidentiary rule is "disproportionate" if it does not serve the ends it is designed to promote. *Id.* at 326.

Under ER 804(b)(3), a defendant may introduce an unavailable declarant's statement against penal interest. A statement qualifies as a statement against penal interest if it so far tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. ER 804(b)(3). Additionally, the rule instructs courts to not admit such statements in a criminal case "unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." *Id.*

To determine whether corroborating circumstances indicate the trustworthiness of a statement under ER 804(b)(3), courts have implemented the nine-factor framework articulated in *Parris*. 98 Wn.2d at 145-47. However, this framework was created to conform to a previous analysis of the right to confrontation that was since abrogated by *Crawford*. *Id.* at 144-45; *Ohio v. Roberts*, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 253, 65

L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980), *abrogated by Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004).

Because the nine-factor test adopted in *Parris* that is used to determine the admissibility of evidence under ER 804(b)(3): (1) no longer ensures that a court will observe an individual's Confrontation Clause rights but excludes important defense evidence; and (2) no longer serves the ends it was designed to promote, i.e., protects an individual's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, the nine-factor test is both arbitrary and disproportionate. *Holmes*, 547 U.S. at 325-26.

The Court of Appeals held that this Court's opinion in *Roberts* bound it to continuously apply the nine-factor test, but nowhere in *Roberts* did the defendant launch the challenge to this test that Jeremy launched in his briefing. *See generally State v. Roberts*, 142 Wn.2d 471, 14 P.3d 713 (2000). This Court should accept review because this nine-factor test is outdated and inimical to a defendant's right to present a defense. RAP 13.4(b)(3).

4. This Court should accept review to assess whether, under our constitution, juveniles have the right to a jury trial.

Both the state and federal constitutions recognize the enshrined right to a jury of one's peers. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Const. art. I, §§ 3, 21. This right "shall remain inviolate." Const. art. I, section 21.

Pursuant to this right, “the life and liberty of the citizen” cannot not be entrusted to a single judge without a knowing and voluntary waiver. *See Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145, 151–56, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 491 (1968); *State v. Stegall*, 123 Wn.2d 719, 724–25, 881 P.2d 979 (1994). However, juveniles like Jeremy are denied their constitutional right to a jury trial pursuant to state statute. *See* RCW 13.04.021(2) (“Cases in the juvenile court shall be tried without a jury.”).

In *State v. Smith*, this Court recognized that the state constitutional right to a jury trial must be analyzed in light of the law as it existed at the time the constitution was adopted. 150 Wn.2d 135, 153, 75 P.3d 934 (2003). When the Washington constitution was adopted in 1881, the law did not differentiate between juveniles and adults, and thus both were entitled to jury trials. Code of 1881, ch. 87, § 1078. When the juvenile courts were established, state law continued to provide the right to demand trial by jury. *See* Laws of 1905, ch. 18, § 2. However, this law was repealed in 1937, stripping juveniles of this constitutional right. Laws of 1937, ch. 65, § 1, at 211.

In *State v. Chavez*, this Court affirmed previous decisions holding that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial. 163 Wn.2d 262, 269–72, 180 P.3d 1250 (2008) (collecting cases). However, in doing so, this Court did not address *Smith*’s maxim that the “extent of the [jury] right must be

determined from the law and practice that existed in Washington at the time of our constitution's adoption in 1889." 150 Wn.2d at 151. Instead, this Court adopted the reasoning that, "while juvenile proceedings are similar to adult criminal prosecutions, enough distinctions still exist to justify denying juvenile offenders the right to a trial by jury." 163 Wn.2d at 269 (citations and quotation marks omitted); *see also State v. Schaaf*, 109 Wn.2d 1, 13, 743 P.2d 240 (1987) ("juvenile proceedings do not yet so resemble adult proceedings that a jury trial is required.").

This is not the correct standard in light of *Smith*. Moreover, "[n]o offense can be deemed so petty as to warrant denying a jury if it constitutes a crime." *Pasco v. Mace*, 98 Wn.2d 87, 99, 653 P.2d 618 (1983). Here, Jeremy was not convicted of some "petty" crime, but a serious felony, carrying serious, life-long consequences. His trial differed from an adult trial for the same crime in only one crucial respect: the absence of a jury.

This Court should accept review. RAP 13.4(b)(3).

5. This Court should accept review because for some unknown reason, the Court of Appeals refused to correct its opinion.

The Court of Appeals' opinion incorrectly notes that Jeremy conceded probable cause existed to record his brother, James. Jeremy made no such concession that probable cause existed to record his brother,

and so he filed a motion respectfully asking the court to remove this portion of the opinion. Op. at 9. The Court of Appeals refused, but no reason existed to deny the motion. This Court should accept review. RAP 13.4(b)(4).

F. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Jeremy respectfully requests that this Court accept review.

DATED this 29th day of January, 2020.

Respectfully submitted,

/s Sara S. Taboada
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Washington Appellate Project
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Appendix A

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

J.K.T.,

Appellant.

DIVISION ONE

No. 78413-7-1

PUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: December 30, 2019

DWYER, J. — Juvenile J.K.T. was convicted of multiple counts of murder in the first degree for his participation, allegedly with his older brothers James and Jerome, in a 2016 shooting in the homeless encampment known as “The Jungle.” J.K.T. appeals, contending that the trial court erred by ruling admissible a one-party consent recording of J.K.T. and his brothers discussing the shooting and by excluding hearsay statements that J.K.T. sought to admit in his defense. J.K.T. asserts that the recording of him and his brothers was obtained in violation of Washington’s privacy act, chapter 9.73 RCW, and that it should have been excluded. He further asserts that the trial court improperly excluded exculpatory hearsay statements made against penal interest, thereby denying him the right to present a defense. There being no error in the trial court rulings, we affirm.

On January 26, 2016, five males wearing masks and dark clothing entered a section of the homeless encampment known as “The Jungle,” located beneath a freeway in Seattle near the intersection of Interstates 5 and 90. The section of encampment they entered was occupied at the time by many people, including Phat Nguyen, Amy Jo Shinault, Tracy Bauer, Jeanine Brooks, and James Tran. Two of the masked individuals had guns and began shooting the occupants of the encampment, killing both Tran and Brooks. The masked attackers also shot Nguyen, Shinault, and Bauer. They survived.

The next day, Foa’l Tautolo, known as “Lucky,” contacted the police, claiming to have information about the shootings. Lucky and his cousin, known as “Reno,” went to the Seattle Police Department’s headquarters to be interviewed. Lucky informed the police that his nephew, James, had called him and admitted to participating in the shooting because he needed money. Lucky also informed the police that he had, in the previous few days, seen his nephew with a .45 caliber handgun.² Lucky believed that James would be willing to discuss the shootings with him and Reno again in person.

The lead detective in the case, James Cooper, then prepared an application for a judicial authorization to make a one-party consent recording of James. In the application, Detective Cooper included the information he had received from Lucky regarding James admitting to the shooting and sought authorization to record him speaking about the shootings with Lucky. The

² The police had found matching caliber bullet shell casings at the scene of the shooting.

application also noted that James and his family were known to have been “staying near/under 4th Ave South and Edgar Martinez Way.”³ The application further stated that the conversations it sought authorization to record were “expected to occur somewhere in or around Seattle in one of the many homeless camps in the area. Because James, his brothers and their families are homeless and move around, it is impossible to predict where the conversation may take place[.] Investigators do believe they will remain in the area, and within King County.”

The authorization order was signed by a King County superior court judge. The order stated that there was probable cause to believe that James had committed murder in the second degree and assault in the first degree.

The next day, Lucky and Reno were wired and dropped off near James’s encampment on 4th Avenue South in Seattle. Lucky had arranged, over the telephone, to meet James at James’s encampment near “the stadium.”⁴ The recording occurred near an underpass across the street from what Lucky referred to as “like a Goodwill, but it’s not a Goodwill.”⁵ James, Jerome, and J.K.T. were present during the conversation and made statements leading officers to believe that they all actively participated in the shooting.

J.K.T. was subsequently charged with felony murder in the first degree predicated on robbery and assault. J.K.T. moved to suppress the one-party

³ The cross street in the application contained a typographical error. There is no Edgar Martinez Way that intersects with 4th Avenue South; instead, the name of the street is Edgar Martinez Drive South.

⁴ There are actually two stadiums located adjacent to one another on 4th Avenue South. It is unclear from the record to which stadium Lucky was referring.

⁵ It appears that Lucky was referencing the Salvation Army Family Store, as it is the only store on 4th Avenue South across the street from the stadiums that matches Lucky’s description.

consent recording in which he and his brothers discussed the shooting, arguing that it was obtained in violation of Washington's privacy act. The trial court denied the motion. J.K.T. subsequently and unsuccessfully sought to exclude James's and Jerome's statements in the recording on the grounds that they were inadmissible hearsay and violated his right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to confront the witnesses against him.⁶

During his bench trial, J.K.T. sought to offer into evidence that which he asserted constituted exculpatory hearsay statements made by others against their penal interest. Specifically, he sought to admit the hearsay statements of two individuals, known as Ace and Francis, who had purportedly informed one of the shooting victims, Bauer, that they, and not J.K.T. and his brothers, were active participants in the shooting. The trial court concluded that these statements were insufficiently reliable to warrant their admission into evidence.

The juvenile court found J.K.T. guilty of two counts of murder in the first degree and three counts of assault in the first degree. The court imposed a manifest injustice disposition that rendered J.K.T. into the custody of the juvenile rehabilitation authority until he is 20 years old. Treatment-related supervision is to follow his release.

J.K.T. appeals.

⁶ J.K.T. does not appeal from the ruling that his right to confront the witnesses against him, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, did not bar the admission of his brothers' statements in the recording.

II

J.K.T. primarily contends that his conviction must be reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence the one-party consent recording of him and his brothers discussing the shooting. This is so, J.K.T. asserts, because (1) the recording was obtained in violation of Washington's privacy act, and (2) admission of the recorded statements of J.K.T.'s brothers violated J.K.T.'s right to confront the witnesses against him as guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution, a contention raised for the first time on appeal. We disagree.

A

J.K.T. contends that the one-party consent recording showing J.K.T. and his brothers discussing the shooting was obtained in violation of the privacy act because (1) the application for the authorization to record without the consent of all parties to the conversation does not establish probable cause that J.K.T. had committed a crime, and (2) the application for the order authorizing the recording and the order authorizing the recording did not set forth a specific enough place as to where the recording would occur so as to satisfy the requirements of the privacy act.

We review the meaning of a statute de novo. State v. Breazeale, 144 Wn.2d 829, 837, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001). Our "fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's intent, and if the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then [we] must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent." Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC,

146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). When interpreting a provision of our state's code, the provision is to "be liberally construed, and shall not be limited by any rule of strict construction." RCW 1.12.010. Where a statute does not define a term, we may look to dictionary definitions to assist in determining the plain meaning of a statute. LaCoursiere v. Camwest Dev., Inc., 181 Wn.2d 734, 741-42, 339 P.3d 963 (2014).

Washington's privacy act protects the privacy rights of individuals and is one of the most restrictive electronic surveillance laws in the country. State v. Roden, 179 Wn.2d 893, 898, 321 P.3d 1183 (2014). The act generally prohibits the admission at trial of recorded conversations or communications obtained without the consent of all parties to the conversation. RCW 9.73.030; Roden, 179 Wn.2d at 898. "Failure to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the act is prejudicial unless, within reasonable probability, the erroneous admission of the evidence did not materially affect the outcome of the trial. State v. Christensen, 153 Wn.2d 186, 200, 102 P.3d 789 (2004) (citing State v. Porter, 98 Wn. App. 631, 638, 990 P.2d 460 (1999)).

RCW 9.73.090, however, sets forth exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the recording of conversations or communications without the consent of all parties. One such exception is that

[i]t shall not be unlawful for a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of the officer's official duties to intercept, record, or disclose an oral communication or conversation where the officer is a party to the communication or conversation or one of the parties to the communication or conversation has given prior consent to the interception, recording, or disclosure: PROVIDED, That prior to the interception, transmission, or recording the officer shall obtain written or telephonic authorization from a judge or magistrate, who

shall approve the interception, recording, or disclosure of communications or conversations with a nonconsenting party for a reasonable and specified period of time, if there is probable cause to believe that the nonconsenting party has committed, is engaged in, or is about to commit a felony.

RCW 9.73.090(2).

RCW 9.73.090(2) further states that “[a]ny recording or interception of a communication or conversation incident to a lawfully recorded or intercepted communication or conversation pursuant to this subsection shall be lawful and may be divulged.”

An application for an order authorizing a one-party consent recording must comply with the requirements set forth in RCW 9.73.130. State v. D.J.W., 76 Wn. App. 135, 144-45, 882 P.2d 1199 (1994), aff’d, 129 Wn.2d 211, 916 P.2d 384 (1996). These statutory safeguards protect against “unfettered discretion in the hands of the recording party and against the issuance of authorizations to record in the absence of proper circumstances.” D.J.W., 76 Wn. App. at 145. An order based on a faulty application, not in compliance with RCW 9.73.130, is unlawful, and any recording authorized by such an order is inadmissible as evidence. State v. Kichinko, 26 Wn. App. 304, 310-11, 613 P.2d 792 (1980).

The following information must be included in an application for an order authorizing a one-party consent recording:

- (1) The authority of the applicant to make such application;
- (2) The identity and qualifications of the investigative or law enforcement officers or agency for whom the authority to record a communication or conversation is sought and the identity of whoever authorized the application;
- (3) A particular statement of the facts relied upon by the applicant to justify his or her belief that an authorization should be issued, including:

(a) The identity of the particular person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications or conversations are to be recorded;

(b) The details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed;

(c) The particular type of communication or conversation to be recorded and a showing that there is probable cause to believe such communication will be communicated on the wire communication facility involved or at the particular place where the oral communication is to be recorded;

(d) The character and location of the particular wire communication facilities involved or the particular place where the oral communication is to be recorded;

(e) A statement of the period of time for which the recording is required to be maintained, if the character of the investigation is such that the authorization for recording should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication or conversation has been first obtained, a particular statement of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter;

(f) A particular statement of facts showing that other normal investigative procedures with respect to the offense have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous to employ;

(4) Where the application is for the renewal or extension of an authorization, a particular statement of facts showing the results thus far obtained from the recording, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results;

(5) A complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications, known to the individual authorizing and to the individual making the application, made to any court for authorization to record a wire or oral communication involving any of the same facilities or places specified in the application or involving any person whose communication is to be intercepted, and the action taken by the court on each application; and

(6) Such additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of the application as the judge may require.

RCW 9.73.130.

“A judge issuing an intercept order has considerable discretion to determine whether the statutory safeguards [of the privacy act] have been satisfied.” Porter, 98 Wn. App. at 634. Thus, when reviewing an application for

an order authorizing a one-party consent recording, we “decide if the facts set forth in the application were minimally adequate to support the determination that was made.” State v. Manning, 81 Wn. App. 714, 718, 915 P.2d 1162 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Knight, 54 Wn. App. 143, 150-51, 772 P.2d 1042 (1989)).

1

J.K.T. asserts that the application filed herein for an order authorizing a one-party consent recording did not establish probable cause as to J.K.T., as required by RCW 9.73.090(2), and that it is therefore inadmissible against him. However, J.K.T. also concedes that the application established probable cause sufficient to authorize the recording of J.K.T.’s brother, James. We agree with the parties that probable cause as to James was established. Accordingly, under the circumstances herein, no such finding as to J.K.T. was required.

The recording of utterances made by James was plainly supported by a finding of probable cause. In addition, RCW 9.73.090(2) is clear that conversations or communications recorded “incident to a lawfully recorded or intercepted communication or conversation pursuant to this subsection shall be lawful and may be divulged.” The parties dispute whether this language applies to J.K.T. and (impliedly) Jerome, disagreeing as to the meaning of the word “incident.” The State essentially contends that “incident” means “ancillary” or “as part of,” and that the admission of the recording of J.K.T. was proper because it was obtained as part of a lawful recording of James. In contrast, J.K.T. asserts that “incident” means, essentially, “accidentally,” and that because Detective

Cooper planned or hoped to record James and his brothers together, the recording of J.K.T. was not accidental, thus rendering the contents of the recording inadmissible against J.K.T. The State has the better argument.

Because there is no statutory definition of “incident,” we look to dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of the word. LaCoursiere, 181 Wn.2d at 741-42. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “incident” as “something dependent upon, appertaining or subordinate to, or accompanying something else of greater or principal importance.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1142 (2002). Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “incident” as “[d]ependent on, subordinate to, arising out of, or otherwise connected with (something else, usu. of greater importance).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (11th ed. 2019).

It is apparent from these definitions that the State’s view of the statutory language is correct. Here, “incident” does not mean “accidental.” Thus, so long as the authorization to record James was supported by probable cause, which it was, the incidental recording of J.K.T. need not be independently supported by probable cause as to him in order to be admissible at trial against him.⁷

⁷ J.K.T. also asserts that three material misrepresentations in the application “form no basis for establishing any probable cause to surreptitiously record [J.K.T.]” Because probable cause was not required to be established as to J.K.T., this argument fails. Furthermore, J.K.T.’s asserted material misrepresentations were not, in fact, material to the court’s finding of probable cause as to James.

First, J.K.T. asserts that the application’s description of James and his family as being “involved” in previous unsolved crimes was a material misrepresentation because it painted James’s family as the kind of people who would commit crimes. Given that the application stated that James confessed to the shooting, was known to possess a gun with bullets matching those removed from one of the victims of the shooting, and resembled the, admittedly vague, physical description of the shooters given by witnesses, it is clear that probable cause was not dependent on any previous potential involvement in or association with criminal activity.

Second, J.K.T. asserts that the application omitted material information regarding Lucky’s and Reno’s criminal history and that they were compensated for the information they provided.

J.K.T. next asserts that both the application for the order authorizing a one-party consent recording and the order itself did not set forth a sufficiently specific location for the place where the recording would occur to satisfy the requirements of the privacy act. Although he did not clearly articulate that which he would consider a sufficiently specific location, it appears that J.K.T. believes that something approximating the specificity of a street address is required to be included in both the application and the order authorizing a recording, and that the application's inclusion of a cross street and a description of the location as being a homeless encampment was insufficient. In response, the State asserts that (1) the application sufficiently informed the authorizing judge of the character and location of the place where the recording would occur by informing the judge that the recording would take place at a homeless encampment and identifying the cross street near the encampment in which James was last known to be staying, and (2) the order did not need to set forth a specific location where recording was authorized. We conclude that the authorization and the

However, J.K.T. also acknowledges that the application stated that Lucky and Reno have criminal histories. Additionally, the fact that Lucky and Reno could benefit from providing assistance in an active homicide investigation would lead to an inference that their evidence would be credible—providing inaccurate information would not help them receive favorable treatment. The probable cause analysis was plainly not affected by the omission of the specifics of Lucky's and Reno's criminal histories or speculation about how much time off of potential sentences they stood to gain. In addition, it is plainly wrong to suggest that the judge authorizing the recording was unaware that criminal informants generally want to receive some form of favor in exchange for their assistance.

Third, J.K.T. asserts that one line in the application, stating that witnesses to the shooting could not identify the shooters, materially misinformed the authorizing court because one of the victims did identify her shooter as a man known as Juice. However, the application expressly states that "one of the males involved in the shooting was possibly a Samoan male known only by the street name of 'Juice.'" Plainly, the application did not misinform the court on this point.

application for authorization herein complied with the requirements of the privacy act regarding inclusion of the place where the recording would occur.

Under the privacy act, an order authorizing a one-party consent recording must (1) be obtained prior to making the recording, (2) be limited to a “reasonable and specified period of time,” and (3) be supported by probable cause to believe that the nonconsenting party has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a felony. RCW 9.73.090(2). There is no requirement that an order authorizing a one-party consent recording delineate the place where recording is authorized.⁸ Knight, 54 Wn. App. at 149.

Under RCW 9.73.130(3)(d), however, applications for an order authorizing a one-party consent recording must include a particular statement of “the facts relied upon by the applicant to justify his or her belief that an authorization should be issued, including: . . . (d) The character and location of the particular wire communication facilities involved or the particular place where the oral communication is to be recorded.”⁹ J.K.T. appears to assert that this statutory

⁸ J.K.T. contends, without citation to authority, that an order authorizing a one-party consent recording must include a particular location of the place where recording is authorized because a particular place is required, under RCW 9.73.130, to be included in the application for an order. This is wrong. RCW 9.73.130 plainly does not set forth any requirements for an order authorizing a one-party consent recording; it sets forth only requirements for the application.

⁹ This requirement applies to all applications seeking authorization under RCW 9.73.090 except in cases where there is probable cause “to believe that the communication or conversation concerns the unlawful manufacture, delivery, sale, or possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, controlled substances . . . or legend drugs . . . or imitation controlled substances.” RCW 9.73.090(5). In such cases a judge may authorize a one-party consent recording even though the true name of the nonconsenting party, or the particular time and place for the interception, transmission, recording, or disclosure, is not known at the time of the request, if the authorization describes the nonconsenting party and subject matter of the communication or conversation with reasonable certainty under the circumstances.

RCW 9.73.090(5).

J.K.T. asserts that this subsection and RCW 9.73.210(2) and RCW 9.73.230(2)(e) show that the legislature relaxed a particularity requirement in RCW 9.73.130 for specific crimes, allowing a judge to authorize recordings with only an imprecise location for specific crimes

language requires that an application include either the character and location of the particular wire communication facilities involved, or, the particular place where the oral communication is to be recorded. This misreads the statute. Under the series qualifier canon, “[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, *READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS*, at 147 (2012). Thus, the prepositive modifier in RCW 9.73.130(3)(d), “character and location,” applies to both the wireless communication facilities and to the particular place where the oral communication is to be recorded.¹⁰

In determining whether an application has sufficiently identified the character and location of the place where the recording of an oral communication

relating to commercial sexual abuse of a minor and drug trafficking and manufacture. J.K.T. is wrong. These statutes do not change the level of detail about a place required in an application for a judicial order authorizing recording. First, RCW 9.73.210 and RCW 9.73.230 have nothing to do with judicial authorizations to make one-party consent recordings. Rather, they address the requirements for a chief law enforcement officer to authorize a one-party consent recording and have no bearing on RCW 9.73.130. Second, RCW 9.73.090(5) does not change the level of specificity required to be included in an application regarding the intended place for a one-party consent recording. Instead, it eliminates the requirement that a place be included at all. No place is necessary so long as “the authorization describes the nonconsenting party and subject matter of the communication or conversation with reasonable certainty under the circumstances.” RCW 9.73.090(5). There is no requirement that a less specific or imprecise place be included. Thus, RCW 9.73.090(5) does not provide any insight into the degree of specificity the legislature intended to be required under RCW 9.73.130(3)(d).

¹⁰ If, as J.K.T. suggests, the statute required an application to include only a specific street address for where recording is expected to occur, a judge considering whether to grant authorization to record would be unable to properly consider the risk of recording innocent conversations or to require appropriate safeguards when granting authorization. For example, there is a different level of risk between recording at a therapist’s office, a church, a closed door legislative session, a baseball game, or a private home or office, but a street address would not properly inform the judge of these differences. Furthermore, even some locations with street addresses, such as state parks, cover many square miles of area quite distant from the location of their official street address. A street address, while sometimes useful for assisting a judge in determining whether to grant authorization, is merely one possible means of informing the judge of the location of the particular place where a recording is expected to occur.

will occur, we are conscious of our decision in D.J.W., stating that the requirements set forth in RCW 9.73.130 provide protection against “unfettered discretion in the hands of the recording party.” 76 Wn. App. at 145. Thus, our inquiry is to determine whether the application sufficiently identified the character and location of the particular place where recording of the oral communication was expected to occur such that it was not seeking unfettered discretion to record.¹¹

However, the privacy act does not set forth definitions for “character and location” nor for “particular place.” Thus, we again look to dictionary definitions to assist in ascertaining the meaning of the statutory language. LaCoursiere, 181 Wn.2d at 741-42. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “character” as “one of the essentials of structure, form, materials, or function that together make up and usu. distinguish the individual,” and as the “main or essential nature esp. as strongly marked and serving to distinguish.” WEBSTER’S, supra, at 376. “Location” is defined as “a position or site occupied or available for occupancy (as by a building) or marked by some distinguishing feature” and as “an area or tract of land.” WEBSTER’S, supra, at 1327. “Particular” is defined as “of, relating to, or being a single definite person or thing as distinguished from some or all others.” WEBSTER’S, supra, at 1646. And “place” is defined as “an indefinite region or expanse” and as “a particular portion of a surface.”

¹¹ We therefore reject the State’s assertion at oral argument that it was sufficient for the application to describe the recording equipment used to make the recording and to state that the equipment was placed on Lucky and Reno. Such a description clearly does not place any actual limits on recording because Lucky and Reno could carry the equipment attached to their persons almost anywhere.

WEBSTER'S, supra, at 1727. Thus, RCW 9.73.130(3)(d) requires an application to include a description of the nature and position of a region, or area, such that it can be identified and distinguished from other areas.

Although of limited help, two cases provide some insight into that which constitutes a sufficient description of the character and location of the particular place where an oral communication is to be recorded. See Porter, 98 Wn. App. 631; Knight, 54 Wn. App. 143. However, neither of these cases determined that which constitutes a sufficient description of the “character and location” of the “particular place where the oral communication is to be recorded.”

In Knight, the defendant, having been charged and convicted of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, asserted on appeal that the application for the authorization to record him, on multiple occasions, delivering cocaine to an undercover officer did not include a sufficient description of the location of all the places at which the police anticipated the recordings would occur. 54 Wn. App. at 149. Division Three rejected this argument, noting that “[t]he application specifically identified two locations, one of which was the address where the recorded communications actually occurred.”¹² Knight, 54 Wn. App. at 149. Thus, it is clear that an application satisfies the location requirements of RCW 9.73.130(3)(d) if it included the location of the place where the recording actually occurs, regardless of whether it included the locations of

¹² The legislature had not yet added subsection (5) to RCW 9.73.090 at the time the police applied for and obtained an order authorizing the recording of Knight. See former RCW 9.73.090, LAWS OF 1986, ch. 38, § 2. Thus, even though Knight was being recorded as part of an investigation into the crime of delivery of a controlled substance, the application was still required to include the character and location of the particular place where the communication was to be recorded under RCW 9.73.130.

other places the police may have anticipated recording.

In Porter, the defendant was charged and convicted with possession of methamphetamine, but asserted on appeal that the application for authorization to record him discussing obtaining methamphetamines did not sufficiently describe the particular place where his communications would be recorded. 98 Wn. App. at 634, 637. The application stated that recordings would occur in unknown locations in Yakima County or adjacent counties.¹³ Porter, 98 Wn. App. at 633. In response, the State asserted that no location was required to be included in the application at all because of RCW 9.73.090(5). Porter, 98 Wn. App. at 637.

The court rejected the State's argument, noting that Porter was charged only with possession, not with any intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell controlled substances, and that, therefore, RCW 9.73.090(5) was inapplicable. Porter, 98 Wn. App. at 637. It appears that the State did not present any argument that its application satisfied the requirements of RCW 9.73.130(3)(d), as the court did not discuss any such contention. Ultimately, the court concluded that the application failed to satisfy several of the requirements set forth in RCW 9.73.130, including the requirement in subsection (3)(d). Porter, 98 Wn. App. at 632. Thus, Porter stands for the unremarkable proposition that an application that provides only that the recording may occur in any "unknown location" within any one of nine different counties is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of RCW 9.73.130(3)(d).

¹³ Yakima County is adjacent to eight counties: Benton, Grant, King, Kittitas, Klickitat, Lewis, Pierce, and Skamania.

We now consider the application for an authorization to record submitted herein. The application stated that James and his brothers had been “staying near/under 4th Ave South and Edgar Martinez Way” in Seattle.¹⁴ It further stated that the recordings were “expected to occur somewhere in or around Seattle in one of the many homeless camps in the area.” The application noted that because James and his family were homeless “and move around, it is impossible to predict where the conversation may take place[.] Investigators do believe they will remain in the area, and within King County.” After receiving authorization, Lucky and Reno met with James and his brothers at the homeless encampment the brothers were staying in at the time. Although Lucky was unable to identify a street address for the encampment, he explained that it was near the stadium and across the street from a clothing donation store similar to a Goodwill. This location is approximately a block and a half north of the intersection of 4th Avenue South and Edgar Martinez Drive South.¹⁵

We conclude that this information was minimally adequate to satisfy the requirement of RCW 9.73.130(3)(d) that the application set forth the character and location of the particular place where recording is expected to occur. The application accurately stated that recording was expected to occur in a homeless encampment in Seattle. Additionally, the recording actually took place only a

¹⁴ Again, there is no Edgar Martinez *Way* that intersects with 4th Avenue South in Seattle. Instead, there is an Edgar Martinez *Drive* South that intersects with 4th Avenue South.

¹⁵ Location of Salvation Army Family Store & Donation Center, GOOGLE MAPS, <https://www.google.com/maps/place/The+Salvation+Army+Family+Store+%26+Donation+Center/@47.592941,-122.3322453,16z/data=!4m8!1m2!2m1!1sSalvation+army+family+store+4th+ave+s!3m4!1s0x0:0x623e820aa957ec22!8m2!3d47.594304!4d-122.3284534> [https://perma.cc/CEG9-C2PQ].

block and a half away from the cross street identified in the application.¹⁶ Even read at its broadest, the application herein specified that the recording was expected to occur in a homeless encampment in Seattle, and certainly within King County. This is far more specific than the language—describing unknown locations in one of nine counties—rejected as insufficient in Porter. Contrary to J.K.T.’s assertions, this application plainly did not seek “unfettered discretion” to record anywhere in King County but, rather, sought authorization to record James at his homeless encampment in Seattle, likely located near the intersection of 4th Avenue South and Edgar Martinez Drive South. This is exactly what occurred. The application satisfied the requirements of RCW 9.73.130(3)(d). The trial court properly ruled that this was so.

B

J.K.T. next contends that the admission of the recording of his brothers discussing the shooting violated his right to confront the witnesses against him, guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution.¹⁷ In response, the State notes that J.K.T. did not raise this argument before the trial court and asserts that J.K.T. has therefore forfeited any right to raise this argument on appeal. The State is correct.

¹⁶ Given the close proximity and the nebulous nature of homeless encampments, in that they do not typically have set street addresses or boundaries, it is possible that James was living in the same homeless encampment at the time of the recording as when he was observed at the cross streets identified in the application. Even were this not so, it is clear that the recording took place in close proximity to the cross streets identified in the application.

¹⁷ To reiterate, J.K.T. does not challenge the trial court’s ruling that admission of the recording did not violate J.K.T.’s right to confront the witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. His contention on appeal is solely that his right to confront witnesses, as guaranteed by the Washington Constitution, was violated. He did not raise this argument in the trial court.

As our Supreme Court noted in State v. Burns, 193 Wn.2d 190, 207, 438 P.3d 1183 (2019), both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution afford the accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her. However, approving of our ruling in State v. O’Cain, 169 Wn. App. 228, 279 P.3d 926 (2012), the Supreme Court adopted “a requirement that a defendant raise an objection at trial or waive the right of confrontation.” Burns, 193 Wn.2d at 210-11. The court explained that “[w]here a defendant does not object at trial, ‘nothing the trial court does or fails to do is a denial of the right, and if there is no denial of a right, there is no error by the trial court, manifest or otherwise, that an appellate court can review.’” Burns, 193 Wn.2d at 211 (quoting State v. Fraser, 170 Wn. App. 13, 25-26, 282 P.3d 152 (2012)).

J.K.T. concedes that he did not raise his state constitutional confrontation clause claim in the trial court, but asserts that we should nevertheless consider his argument on appeal because it satisfies the requirements of RAP 2.5(a)(3).¹⁸ This is contrary to Burns.¹⁹ Burns, citing to both the federal and state confrontation clauses, is clear that a defendant forfeits the right to confront the witnesses against him or her if the defendant does not assert such a right at trial by raising an objection. 193 Wn.2d at 210-11. Furthermore, as Burns notes, without an objection, there simply is no denial of the defendant’s right to confront witnesses and there can be no error. Thus, there was no denial of J.K.T.’s right

¹⁸ This rule permits review of errors raised for the first time on appeal when the error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” RAP 2.5(a)(3).

¹⁹ J.K.T. does not even cite to Burns in his briefing and makes no effort to argue that it is inapplicable herein. We follow Burns.

to confront the witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Washington Constitution.

III

J.K.T. next contends that the trial court erred when it prohibited him from eliciting testimony from Bauer as to hearsay statements uttered by Ace and Francis regarding the shooting. According to J.K.T., the trial court's application of a nine-factor test promulgated by our Supreme Court for determining the reliability of hearsay statements made against penal interest—used to determine whether they are admissible under ER 804(b)(3)—was improper because the test is premised on a now overruled United States Supreme Court decision setting forth reliability requirements for inculpatory statements from witnesses. J.K.T. further asserts that the hearsay statements made against penal interest that he sought to admit satisfied the requirements of ER 804(b)(3), and, therefore, that exclusion of the statements violated J.K.T.'s constitutional right to present a defense. In response, the State asserts that J.K.T. is mistaken that the nine-factor reliability test is premised on now overruled United States Supreme Court precedent, that J.K.T.'s proffered hearsay statements are unreliable under the test, and that exclusion of the statements was therefore proper and not a violation of J.K.T.'s right to present a defense. The State has the better arguments.

“Decisions involving evidentiary issues lie largely within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” State v. Castellanos, 132 Wn.2d 94, 97, 935 P.2d 1353

(1997). Thus, a trial court's decision on the reliability of a hearsay statement made against penal interest, under ER 804(b)(3), is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. McDonald, 138 Wn.2d 680, 693, 981 P.2d 443 (1999).

Hearsay statements are generally not admissible, but there are exceptions. ER 802. One such exception is set forth by ER 804(b)(3):

(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

.....
(3) *Statement Against Interest.* A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. In a criminal case, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

A hearsay statement made against penal interest is admissible when three requirements are met: (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify, (2) the declarant's statement must tend to subject him or her to criminal liability, and (3) the statement must be corroborated by circumstances indicating its trustworthiness. State v. Valladares, 99 Wn.2d 663, 668, 664 P.2d 508 (1983). Our Supreme Court long ago established that to determine whether a hearsay statement against interest satisfies the requirement of trustworthiness, courts should assess a statement's reliability using a nine-factor reliability test. State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 497-98, 14 P.3d 713 (2000); State v. Welchel, 115 Wn.2d 708, 722, 801 P.2d 948 (1990); State v. Anderson, 107 Wn.2d 745, 750, 733 P.2d 517 (1987); see also State v. Parris, 98 Wn.2d 140, 151, 654 P.2d 77

(1982). The nine factors are:

1. Was there an apparent motive for declarant to lie?
2. What was the declarant's general character?
3. Did more than one witness hear declarant's statement?
4. Was the statement made spontaneously?
5. Did the timing of the statements and the relationship between declarant and witness suggest trustworthiness?
6. Does the statement contain an express assertion of past facts?
7. Did the declarant have personal knowledge of the identity and role of the crime's other participants?
8. Was the declarant's statement based upon faulty recollection?
9. Was the statement made under circumstances that provide reason to believe the declarant misrepresented defendant's involvement in the crime?

Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 497-98 (citing McDonald, 138 Wn.2d at 694).

The trial court herein ruled that consideration of each of these nine factors weighed against concluding that the hearsay statements of Ace and Francis were reliable. J.K.T. asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that (1) Ace and Francis had a motive to lie because they wanted to dissuade Bauer from testifying, (2) Ace's and Francis's statements were not spontaneous because Ace and Francis visited Bauer expressly to discuss the shooting, (3) the timing of the statements, being three months after the shooting, did not support a finding of credibility, (4) forensic evidence contradicted Ace's and Francis's retelling of the shooting, and (5) reason existed to suspect Ace and Francis were trying to assist J.K.T. and his brothers. We disagree.

First, J.K.T. asserts that Ace and Francis did not have a motive to lie because they told Bauer that her memory of the shooting was accurate. This has nothing to do with Ace's and Francis's motives and does not establish that the trial court erred when it found that Ace and Francis had a motive to lie.

Second, J.K.T. asserts that the trial court's finding that the statements were not spontaneous was based on an improper interpretation of controlling law because Ace and Francis were not questioned about the shooting and statements are spontaneous unless made in response to direct questioning. J.K.T. cites to State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984) and Parris, 98 Wn.2d 140, to support his position, but neither of these cases holds that only statements elicited by direct questioning are not spontaneous. Although those cases involved hearsay statements elicited by direct questioning, their results do not dictate that statements not resulting from direct questioning are necessarily spontaneous. See Ryan, 103 Wn.2d at 176; Parris, 98 Wn.2d at 163. J.K.T. does not establish that the trial court's conclusion—that Ace and Francis sought out Bauer to tell her about the shooting, that their statements were planned, and that this indicated that the statements were less reliable—was an abuse of discretion.

Third, J.K.T. asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the fact that Ace and Francis only came to discuss the shooting with Bauer three months after it occurred made the statements less reliable. This is a mischaracterization of the trial court's ruling. The trial court explicitly stated that "[t]hree months is not so long a time that memory would be faulty." However, the trial court concluded that the two year gap between Bauer's conversation with Ace and Francis and the time when Bauer would be testifying to their hearsay statements, was long enough to potentially cast doubt on her ability to accurately recall their statements. Thus, the trial court simply did not

conclude that the three-month gap made the statements less reliable and J.K.T. has not established an abuse of discretion.

Fourth, J.K.T. asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court's conclusion that other evidence, particularly forensic evidence, contradicts Ace's and Francis's statements of past fact. Specifically, J.K.T. asserts that the trial court misstated that Ace and Francis told Bauer that Juice shot Bauer and Shinault when Bauer really claimed they told her that Juice shot Bauer and Brooks. Although the trial court did misstate who, according to Bauer, shot whom, the evidence still supports the trial court's conclusion. For example, the forensic evidence conflicted with Ace's and Francis's statements because forensic evidence showed that there were two shooters who used the .45 and .22 caliber firearms possessed by James and his brothers. However, Ace and Francis had told Bauer that there were three shooters and that the brothers were not involved in the shooting. J.K.T. does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that forensic evidence conflicted with Ace's and Francis's hearsay statements.

Fifth, J.K.T. asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it inferred that Ace and Francis may have been trying to assist James and his brothers by creating doubt for Bauer's testimony because they were part of James's community. J.K.T. essentially asserts that such an inference is unreasonable. But, while additional evidence of a closer relationship between Ace, Francis, and James and his brothers would have been stronger supporting evidence for such an inference, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to

conclude that Ace and Francis may have sought to assist James and his brothers as members of their community.

J.K.T. does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it applied the nine-factor reliability test and determined that Ace's and Francis's hearsay statements were not sufficiently reliable to permit their admission into evidence under ER 804(b)(3).

J.K.T. also attempts to frame this issue as a violation of his right, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to present a defense, which would require de novo review.²⁰ State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 719, 230 P.3d 576 (2010). In so doing, he urges us to disregard binding Supreme Court precedent authorizing the exclusion of evidence under ER 804(b)(3). He contends that the nine-factor test required by our Supreme Court is obsolete and unconstitutional because it is premised on an analysis of the federal confrontation clause that the United States Supreme Court rejected in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). J.K.T. is wrong.

J.K.T.'s assertion is clearly rebutted by Roberts. See 142 Wn.2d at 496-97. Therein, the defendant sought to present hearsay statements made by others against their penal interests that he asserted were exculpatory, but the statements were excluded by the trial court. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 481-83. On

²⁰ The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, including the right to offer testimony and compel witnesses to testify. State v. Lizarraga, 191 Wn. App. 530, 551-52, 364 P.3d 810 (2015) (citing Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006)). A defendant, however, does not have the right to offer incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible evidence. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988).

review, our Supreme Court noted that the confrontation clause was not at issue because the statements were offered by the defendant. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 497. The court explained that this created a presumption in favor of the admissibility of the statements, but did not guarantee they would be admitted. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 496. Before being admitted, the court stated, the statements must be determined to be reliable through application of the nine-factor reliability test.²¹ Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 496-98. Thus, it is clear that the nine-factor reliability test remains the law regarding the application of ER 804(b)(3) to statements made against penal interest offered by a defendant—regardless of any changes to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal constitution’s confrontation clause.

The trial court was bound to apply the nine-factor reliability test set forth in numerous Supreme Court decisions. J.K.T. does not cite to any authority supporting his position that he has a constitutional right to present unreliable hearsay evidence. The trial court did not err by applying the nine-factor reliability test, and did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the hearsay statements were unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible.²²

²¹ Indeed, other cases confirm that the reliability requirement was originally imposed to prevent the admission of unreliable exculpatory statements. See Whelchel, 115 Wn.2d at 716 (“The rule itself expressly requires corroboration only of statements *exculpating* the accused. Case law, however has imposed this requirement for *inculpatory* statements as well.” (footnote omitted)); State v. Ng, 104 Wn.2d 763, 774, 713 P.2d 63 (1985) (“[S]tatements . . . tending to exculpate the accused are more suspect and so should have their admissibility conditioned upon some further provision insuring trustworthiness.” (alterations in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3))).


²² Because we conclude that the trial court’s ruling excluding Ace’s and Francis’s hearsay statements was not erroneous, we need not consider the State’s arguments that the exclusion of the statements was, if erroneous, harmless.

IV


Finally, J.K.T. contends that article I, sections 3 and 21 of the Washington Constitution guaranteed him a right to a jury trial and that the trial court denied him this right. This is well-trod ground. The state legislature has mandated that “[c]ases in the juvenile court shall be tried without a jury.” RCW 13.04.021(2). Our Supreme Court has consistently held that this statute does not violate a juvenile’s constitutional rights. See State v. Weber, 159 Wn.2d 252, 149 P.3d 646 (2006); Monroe v. Soliz, 132 Wn.2d 414, 939 P.2d 205 (1997); State v. Schaaf, 109 Wn.2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987); State v. Lawley, 91 Wn.2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wn.2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968). We follow this longstanding binding precedent in rejecting J.K.T.’s contention.

Affirmed.


WE CONCUR:



A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. J. Johnson", written over a horizontal line.



A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dwyer, J.", written over a horizontal line.



A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Andrew, J.", written over a horizontal line.

Appendix B

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

J.K.T.,

Appellant.

DIVISION ONE


No. 78413-7-I

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
CORRECT/CLARIFY OPINION

The appellant having filed a motion to correct/clarify opinion, and a majority of the panel having determined that the motion should be denied; now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion to correct/clarify opinion be, and the same is, hereby denied.

FOR THE COURT:



DECLARATION OF FILING AND MAILING OR DELIVERY

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the below date, the original document **Petition for Review to the Supreme Court** to which this declaration is affixed/attached, was filed in the **Court of Appeals** under **Case No. 78413-7-I**, and a true copy was mailed with first-class postage prepaid or otherwise caused to be delivered to the following attorney(s) or party/parties of record at their regular office or residence address as listed on ACORDS:

respondent James Whisman, DPA
[PAOAppellateUnitMail@kingcounty.gov]
[Jim.Whisman@kingcounty.gov]
King County Prosecutor's Office-Appellate Unit

petitioner

Attorney for other party



MARIA ANA ARRANZA RILEY, Legal Assistant
Washington Appellate Project

Date: January 29, 2020

WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT

January 29, 2020 - 4:30 PM

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